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Donald Galloway* Necessity as a Justification:
A Critique of Perka**
In his characteristically trenchant and influential investigation, "A Plea
for Excuses",' J. L. Austin reminded us that we can and do use different
strategies of defending a person when it is claimed that he has done
wrong. He drew attention to two distinct tactics:
One way of going about this (defending a person) is to admit that he, X,
did that very thing, A, but to argue that it was a good thing, or the right
or sensible thing, or a permissible thing to do . . . To take this line is to
justify the action, to give reasons for doing it: not to say, to brazen it out,
to glory in it or the like.
A different way of going about it is to admit that it wasn't a good thing
to have done but to argue that it is not quite fair or correct to say badly
"X did A". . . (W)e admit that it was bad but don't accept full or even any
responsibility.2
While admitting that the concepts of justification and excuse may meld
together on occasion and that other concepts live out a shady existence
somewhere between the two, (he offers "extenuation", "palliation" and
"mitigation" as examples), Austin nevertheless urges that the basic
dichotomy be embraced because it does reflect two separate facets of our
moral life.
Austin's exhortation has met with mixed reaction in the legal
community. George Fletcher has been a noted proponent of the
distinction, using it to exemplify the wider and more basic dichotomy
between the concepts of wrongdoing and attribution. 3 Fletcher's
contributions are now being considered and relied on by the judiciary.
Most recently, in Perka v. The Queen, 4 the Supreme Court of Canada,
through" the voice of Dickson J., for the majority and that of Wilson J.,
in a minority opinion, has adopted some aspects of Fletcher's theory of
criminal liability including his classification of criminal defences as
justifications or excuses. However, in both majority and minority
opinions, the conclusions concerning the status of the defence of
*Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University.
**I am grateful to my colleague Don Stuart who offered helpful comment and suggestions.
1. J.L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses", reprinted as Chapter Eight of Philosophical Papers (2nd
ed., 1970) at 175.
2. I at 176.
3. G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking CriminalLaw (1978).
4. Perka v. The Queen (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 385. (Henceforth cited as Perka.)
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necessity, while properly founded on this mode of classifying defences,
are also premised on other, less attractive claims, made in the process of
unpacking the dichotomy. It is worthwhile to inspect the merits of some
of these claims and to pinpoint their shortcomings, for it would be
unfortunate if the general conclusion of the majority in. Perka, that the
defence of necessity operates only as an excuse and not as a justification,
gained unqualified acceptance. In my opinion, this would lead to the
proliferation of argument based on fiction and casuistry. In the pages that
follow, I identify the source of the Court's error to lie in the crudeness of
the distinction drawn between the two concepts, in its failure to recognize
the supple nature of a justification and its willingness to extend the notion
of an excuse beyond its natural limits. Before expanding on these
criticisms, I shall lay out briefly the central tenets in the majority
argument.
Dickson J. introduces his analysis of the defence of necessity by noting
that its status as a legally recognized defence has until now been
questionable. While pointing out that debate continues on this issue in
England, his first move is to settle the question of its availability for
Canada. His earlier remarks on the defence in R. v. Morgentaler were
premised on a conditional clause, ("If it does exist . . ."). In Perka,
Dickson J. removes the condition and diverts his attention to the problem
of identifying the proper ambit of the defence.
The ensuing argument can be summed up in the following point form:
i) Necessity could be either a justification or an excuse. The Criminal
Law recognizes both.
ii) If a justification, it would be founded on the Utilitarian principle
which requires an actor to engage in a "balancing of the benefits of
obeying the law as opposed to disobeying it".6 This is referred to as
the "greater good" formulation of the defence.
iii) If an excuse, the wrongfulness of the act would have to be
conceded.
iv) Necessity ought not to be regarded as a justification because a) the
Legislature has not recognized it as such, and it would be
inappropriate for the courts to "second-guess the Legislature and to
assess the relative merits of social policies underlying criminal
prohibitions" 7; and b) by conceiving of the defence in this way one
would "import an undue subjectivity into the criminal law"8,
5. R. v.Morgentaler(1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 449.
6. Perka at 397.
7. Id at398.
8. Quoted from R. v. Morgentaler (1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 449 at 497.
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because "(n)o system of positive law can recognize any principle
which would entitle a person to violate the law because in his view
the law conflicted with some higher social value."9 The objectivity
of the Criminal Law would be threatened if courts started
recognizing standards of right conduct which contradict and would
overwhelm the application of the standards created by the
legislature. Implicit in this view is the notion that the assessment of
social values is inherently subjective.
N.B. There is an apparent contradiction in Dickson J.'s judgement.
Although he argues at length towards the conclusion that the
Criminal Law ought not to recognize the defence of necessity as a
justification, he nevertheless seems to suggest that the good
Samaritan who breaks the speeding laws to rush an accident victim
to hospital, is justified in doing so. Since this conclusion is
incompatible with his general conclusion, I shall ignore it in the
remainder of the paper, although I do so with great hesitation.
v) These difficulties are bypassed when necessity is conceptualized as
an excuse. As such, it will operate when the evidence reveals that
the accused's conduct, while voluntary in a strict sense, was
"remorselessly compelled by normal human instincts".10
vi) Conditions must be placed on the availability of the defence of
necessity. a) It is restricted to situations of "clear and imminent peril
when compliance with the law is demonstrably impossible"; 1 b)
Since "(n)o rational criminal justice system ... could excuse the
infliction of a greater harm to allow the actor to avert a lesser evil",
the defence is restricted to cases where the harm inflicted is
proportionally less than the harm that is to be avoided. 12
Hence, a future advocate who wished to remain constant to the central
tenets of the judgement when arguing about the applicability of the
defence of necessity will be forced to veer away from stressing the merits
of the accused's conduct, at least, as the main thrust of its pitch. He will
be prevented from brazening it out, to use Austin's phrase. Instead he will
be constrained to characterize the accused's conduct as instinctive, to
characterize the instinct as normal, to characterize alternative action as
demonstrably impossible, and finally to characterize the conduct as a
lesser evil than that averted. My earlier suggestion that such argument
will be based on fiction and casuistry, can be substantiated by pointing
9. Perka at 397.
10. at 398.
11. Id at 400.
12. Id
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out the problems with these characterizations. I shall proceed, first, by
identifying what I regard to be the central defects, and subsequently, shall
attempt to resurrect the notion of necessity as a justification.
The idea of an instinct does much of the work in Dickson J.'s analysis.
Reference to it is made first in the context of developing a particular
example of conduct which would doubtlessly be covered by the defence
of necessity:
The lost Alpinist who, on the point of freezing to death breaks open an
isolated mountain cabin is not literally behaving in an involuntary fashion.
He has control over his actions to the extent of being physically capable
of abstaining from the act. Realistically, however, his act is not a
"voluntary" one. His "choice" to break the law is not true choice at all: it
is remorselessly-compelled by normal human instincts... (T)he act was
wrong but it is excused because it was realistically unavoidable.'3
The use of quotation marks to express the central concepts in this
passage should put the reader on notice that we are on shaky ground.
Another such index is the use of descriptive terminology to express what
is admitted to be a normative judgement. The question, how should this
person have acted? is shelved while attention is paid to the more general
query, how do people behave? The designation of a reaction as instinctive
and the instinct as natural or normal, shortcircuits the inquiry into blame.
After all, a person cannot be faulted merely for expressing his humanity.
However, contrary to Dickson J.'s implication, we are not faced with
a question to be answered by biologists or behavioural scientists. One
distinguishing feature of humankind is the advanced capacity of its
members to transcend the instinctive; to repress drives and restrain urges.
If we conceive of ourselves as having this capacity we should not be
satisfied with a rejoinder to an accusation of fault that the act was
instinctive. Likewise "normalcy" by itself does not respond to the
normative issue. It is not the operation of normal human instincts, per se,
which lead us to acquit the Alpinist. The self-preserving act, instinctive or
not, is not only normal but also regarded as worth fostering. Or, more
precisely, not worth repressing. It is because we do not expect or demand
the Alpinist to exercise "counter-instinctive capacities" that we regard his
conduct differently from that of the person who breaks into the cabin as
an act of revenge.
The focus on instinctive compulsion can be seen more clearly to be
unfortunate if the conduct of an altruist is considered. There is no doubt
that Dickson J. considers that an altruist's generous act may fall within
the defence of necessity. Where the Alpinist himself is in no danger, but
where he breaks into the cabin to get aid for a third party, the judgment
13. Id at 398.
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condemns us to recognizing an excuse only if we are satisfied that his
conduct was remorselessly compelled. If it was compelled, then it would
be singularly inappropriate to praise the Alpinist for saving the party, for
praise should be reserved for those who, realistically could have done
otherwise. I would contend that it is because we regard an altruistic
disposition to be worth developing that we are unwilling to condemn the
second Alpinist who violates the legal rule. He need not persuade us that
his choice was not "true" for us to accept his claim. Our future advocate
will be on stronger ground if he presents the Alpinist, not as a victim of
circumstances, but as a person whose actions have expressed a character
trait which we positively value. Unless we are to regard the altruist as
driven in his acts of benevolence, or unless we are willing to deprive him
of the defence, we should reject Dickson J.'s analysis as being the whole
story.
Further difficulties are raised by the conditions placed on the
availability of the defence. It seems bizarre to stipulate that conduct be
both the lesser of two evils and also the only option which is realistically
possible. The two limitations on the defence seem to contradict each
other. According to the judgement, compliance with the law must be
shown to be an unavailable option and the less preferable option. How
this can be achieved without sleight of hand is hard to fathom.
The need for a limiting device is recognized by Dickson J. because he
has in mind an example of Fletcher's, that of a person who is threatened
with a broken finger if he does not blow up a city. Dickson J. holds that
such a person should not be allowed to take advantage of the defence of
necessity, because compliance with the threat, while involuntary in the
required sense is not the lesser option. The incapacity of this person and
of the Alpinist are regarded as similar; the social worth of this act is
different.
Consistent with what was said above, we can question the
characterization of the conduct as involuntary. I suggest that we condemn
the conduct because we expect the victim of the threat to have developed
the capacity to resist such minor threats especially when so much is at
stake. The difference between the Alpinist and this individual is that the
former reveals himself as a wise decision-maker while the latter reveals
himself as an abject coward, who has placed insufficient weight on the
vital interests of others. Further, the reliance on the idea of
proportionality, that is, the demand that the harm avoided should always
be greater than the harm caused, is based on an additional flaw. While
we accept that there are some things in this world that are more
important than a sifngle human life, or his desire to avoid pain - the
continued existence of a whole population being one - we also know
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that at some point a person's tolerance to pain can be reached and he will
seek alternatives, no matter how much is at stake. The person who is
threatened with a broken finger should be contrasted with the individual
who is subjected to excruciating pain which will be relieved when he
destroys the city. Dickson J.'s approach condemns us to weighing up the
value of the city and the pain, only allowing a defence if we determine
that the continued existence of the city was of lesser value. The
proportionality demand is not sensitive to the fact that people can reach
the end of their tether, and that in such cases we may sympathize with
their predicament to the extent of holding them blameless. Likewise, the
person who is threatened with the broken finger unless he blows up a city
should be distinguished from the person who is threatened with the same
harm unless he hurts others in a minor way, (say, by slapping them) but
not on the ground that instinct compelled the latter choice but not the
former. Assuming the threat of harm to be real and immediate, in both
cases, we can differentiate between the two on the ground that we see
nothing wrong with succumbing to the threat in the latter case. Such
conduct reveals not weakness of character, but balanced judgment. The
victim properly pays regard to his own interests. He need not conivince us
that he could not help his conduct. Of course, recognizing that nothing
wrong was done, gets us tangled in the language of justification. To
continue with this line of thought, it is necessary to develop a present
conception of justification which differs radically from that adopted in
Perk, and to argue for its superiority by exposing the weaknesses in
Dickson J.'s exposition. To this I now turn my attention.
Dickson J. presents justifications as being Utilitarian in nature,
involving a "balancing of the benefits of obeying the law as opposed to
disobeying it". However, contrary to this assumption, it is difficult to fit
into Utilitiarian theory the notion of a justification as a factor which
overwhelms the normal application of a rule. The principal of Utility
stipulates that one has a moral duty to maximize good where goodness is
identified with human happiness, or the satisfaction of preferences or
some other standard. The theory has difficulty dealing with rules, since
rule-following can be valued only instrumentally, insofar as it promotes
Utility. The Utilitarian is pushed in one of two directions. Either he will
be committed to treating rules as absolutes, having determined that
following the rule will, in general, or in the long run, promote Utility.
This commitment will not permit him to have truck with justifications.
Alternatively, he will be committed to inspecting every act which would
be in accordance with the rule to decide if it, as a particular act would
promote Utility. In this case, if he is deciding each case on its merits, it
can scarcely be said that he is following the rule. Both these alternatives
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can be contrasted with the usual approach to justifications adopted in
Criminal Law theory. In most cases, justifications are thought to be
limited in application to extraordinary cases, and prohibitory rules are
applied without concern being given to the utility of doing so in the
particular case. So, it is unacceptable to dismiss justifications as the crude
tools of Utilitarian theory. It is, of course, notoriously difficult to give an
adequate explanation of their role. However, this I shall try to do by
building upon examples which are, I hope, reasonably uncontroversial.
A preliminary point that should be made is that it is not merely
consequences which justify conduct that violates a prohibitory norm.
One need not demonstrate that one actually succeeded in promoting
consequences that were more valuable in order to rely on a justification.
One can separate conduct from consequences, focus solely on the former,
and claim that, in the circumstances, the attempt to bring about the
consequences was justified. However, good intentions alone will not
serve to justify the violation of a norm. In order for an attempt to amount
to a justification, not only must the end be worthy of pursuit, it also must
be appropriate in the circumstances. Unsuccessful attempts are only
accepted as justifications if success was in the cards. We will only admit
a justification if we see the beneficial or permitted consequences as, ex
ante, a realistic possibility.
One can hammer another nail in the Utilitarian's coffin by noting that
in our moral life, we permit individuals to engage in action when they
will not promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The
language of rights, in the sense of permissions is the language that is
appropriate in these cases. The language of duty is avoided because
rights-talk (he has the right to kill him) makes the point that it is the
actor's independence to choose what to do that is being respected.
Respect for a person's independence is inconsistent with Utilitarianism.
As Samuel Scheffler has recently noted,' 4 Utilitarianism is not responsive
to such deeply imbedded, non-consequentialist intuitions as the value of
personal independence. In particular, Utilitarianism demands that a
person is required to devote attention to his own projects "in strict
proportion to the value from an impersonal standpoint of their doing
S0.15 Such a demand does not jibe with the intuition that individuals
should within certain limits be allowed to devote "energy and attention
to their projects and commitments even if their doing so would not on
balance promote the best outcomes overall".' 6 Transferring this analysis
into a Criminal Law context, the claim that one was justified in
14. Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (1982).
15. d at 9.
16. Id at 17.
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contravening a legal rule would have nothing to do with the promotion
of greater good nor the avoidance of the greater evil. Instead, it would
amount to the claim that in the circumstances, respect for a person's
independence or autonomy requires that one allow him to choose
whether or not he is going to violate the rule. Scheffler's point is that
respecting a persons's integrity involves regarding him as a being who
may place more weight on his own projects than they objectively merit.
The question that a court of law might have to address is whether
demanding adherence to the legal rule would require an agent to devote
more attention to and place more value on the interests of others than is
proper for someone who has his own life to lead.
One can find within the Criminal Law recognition and acceptance of
this idea of a right to place more weight on one's own interests than those
of others. The defence of self-defence provides a good example. It is
problematic and ultimately unacceptable to analyse the defence in terms
of the accused doing the right thing, or bringing about the better result
when he kills an aggressor. This would require one to place less value on
the life of the aggressor. While one may be willing to make such a
judgement when the attack is murderous, it is less convincing to explain
the defence in this way when the aggressor is an "innocent", such as a
child or an insane person. Fletcher has delineated an alternative theory of
self-defence, which does not depend on characterizing the life of the
accused as more valuable than that of the aggressor. Instead, he poses the
autonomy of the accused as the value to be protected.
If a person's autonomy is compromised by the intrusion then the defender
has the right to expel the intruder and restore the integrity of his domain.'
Fletcher couches his idea in right-talk, endorsing the idea that the
defender has the option of exercising the right, and engaging in the
defensive conduct. Neither is the conduct mandatory, nor is it necessarily
the right thing to do. The law has granted the actor the discretion to
choose how to act, thereby recognizing him as the ultimate guardian of
his own independence.
This analysis can be transposed to the defence of necessity. However,
in doing so, one confronts some difficult issues. Our intuitions are not so
clear in that context. While we have little difficulty in recognizing the
right of a person to neutralize the attack of an aggressor, even that of a
child or insane person, situations of necessity are more difficult to resolve
because the ultimate victim is not the aggressor.
The following variation on a familiar problem developed by Philippa
17. Fletcher, supra, note 3 at 860.
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Foot18 and Judith Jarvis Thomson 19 brings the issue into' clear light.
Suppose you are working on a trolley track. A trolley careers down the
track out of control, its braking system having failed. The conditions of
work are such that you are unable to remove yourself from the path of
the runaway trolley. However, you are in control of a switch which, if
pressed, will divert the trolley onto a spur of the track before it reaches
you. A fellow worker is located on the spur, himself in a position where
he will be unable to avoid the trolley. Do you have the right to divert the
trolley?
Again I pause to emphasize that the issue focuses on the existence of
a right, rather than on the existence of a duty, or the question what is the
right thing to do. In removing the notion of a justification from the
context of questions of right and wrong I am stressing the point that it
belongs equally in the context of rights, authorizations and permissions.
I believe that it is proper to recognize a right to divert the trolley in the
hypothetical example, on the ground that the worker's protection of his
autonomy may be given more weight by him than it may merit
objectively. The argument is similar to that relied on by the person who
kills the innocent aggressor. Permitting such conduct is consistent with
Scheffler's point that one can identify within our own ethical system
limited prerogatives to be selfish. The delineation of the limits will, of
course, be a difficult task; should the right be recognized when five
workers will be killed by the trolley? The responsibility for engaging in
such delineations should not be shirked by courts and theorists. A large
step will have been taken when the question is framed in terms of how
much selfishness is our society willing to tolerate?, rather than asking
what the right thing to do was, or what acts would normal instincts have
compelled.
One issue to which criminal lawyers will be particularly sensitive will
be whether recognition of a right in the above hypothetical will commit
us to recognition of a defence in such cases as R. v. Dudley and
Stephens,20 where shipwrecked sailors killed and ate an unconsenting
cabin boy. I believe it does not. However, in order to address fully the
differences between the two, I would like to advert to another type of
situation where limited prerogatives should be recognized, namely, where
the conduct is other-regarding or altruistic. Again the trolley example is
helpful. Suppose that the choice to be made by the person at the switch
is not between his own life and that of another, but rather that it is
18. See P. Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect" in Virtues and
Vices and Other Essays (1978).
19. See J.J. Thomson, The Trolley Problem (1985), 94 Yale U. 1395.
20. R. v. Dudley and Stephen (1884), 14 Q.B.D. 273.
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between the lives of five workmen on the track or one workman on the
spur. Does the person at the switch have the right to divert the trolley
away from the five towards the one? This is the very problem that
Thomson untangles in her latest article. From the Criminal Law point of
view, inaction would not be criminal but the act of diversion, involving
as it does an act rather than an omission would prima facie fall under
homicide provisions.
Once again, I believe that a widely shared moral intuition would
suggest that the actor should be permitted to intervene. In this instance
the reason for recognizing the right to intervene, (to "take charge" as
Thomson puts it) does relate to the consequence of one person dying
being adjudged from an impersonal point of view to be a lesser evil than
five dying, other things being equal. But this does not commit us to
grounding justifications on Utilitarian premises. Thomson's article is an
attempt to explain why this is so. She distinguishes the case of the
bystander at the switch from one of a doctor who sacrifices a healthy
person in order to obtain five of his organs each of which is needed by
one of five other people. Utilitarians cannot distinguish between the two
cases. In each, the life of one is being sacrificed for the lives of five.
Compare these situations with a scenario based on Dudley and Stephens,
where an observer in another lifeboat decides to shoot the cabin boy in
order to allow the others to survive by eating the boy, although he himself
will not benefit. In this case, as in the actual case of Dudley and Stephens,
there would be much more hesitancy in recognizing a justification than
in the case of the bystander at the switch. Thomson suggests that her two
examples can be distinguished on two grounds. First, the bystander does
not create a new threat. "He makes be a threat to fewer what is already
a threat to more ... We might speak here of a "distributive exemption"
which permits arranging that something that will do harm anyway shall
be better distributed than it otherwise would. '21 While the bystander has
not, so to speak, brought evil into the world, but has merely channeled
it, the doctor has introduced evil by creating a new threat to the healthy
patient. I believe that Thomson has correctly identified an important
feature of our ethical thought. While it may be objected by the sceptic
that the ground for distinguishing between a "creative" act and a
"channeling" act is somewhat arbitrary, I think it is nevertheless
recognizable as a commonly used device to interpret action, one which
informs our practice and intuitions. Second, the means selected by the
bystander is not in itself an infringement of a person's right, while the
doctor can only save his patients by an act which itself interferes with the
21. Thomson, supra, note 18 at 1408.
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rights of the victim. Similarly, with Dudley and Stephens and the
hypothetical based on it. In the case of the bystander we separate the
conduct from the result and while we may have to admit that the victim
ultimately suffered a right infringement, the act of diverting the train, in
itself did not amount to this.22
These two points may be the reflection of each other, relying as they
both do on the interpretive constructs on which our ethical thought is
based.23 That one does not instigate a new threat in the world but merely
channel it suggests that the act of channeling is not in itself an
infringement of a right. A new threat to an individual as opposed to the
diversion of an existing threat may by definition entail the infringement
of that individual's rights.
Until this point, I have attempted to show that Dickson J.'s analysis of
justifications as Utilitarian devices is unsatisfactory. I have done so by
drawing attention to three situations where justifications play a role in
our ethical thought that Utilitarians cannot handle. - a) where purposes
rather than results justify; b) where permisible self interest justifies, and c)
where redistribution of harm justifies. I also think it is important to
emphasize a fourth situation, where one grounds the justification on the
premise that the right that is infringed is unimportant in comparison with
the end that is achieved. Again, Thomson offers useful examples.24 The
intuition that the bystander be permitted to divert the train is unchanged
by the fact that he has to trespass in order to get to the switch. It would
also be unchanged if he had to steal a device to operate the switch. But
it may be changed if he gave the victim a guarantee that he was in no
danger, and it was only because of that guarantee that the victim had
ventured on to the tracks. The case of the Alpinist is relevant in this
context. The Alpinist, whether in charge of boy scouts or on his own
sacrifies rights for more important concerns. Thomson reminds us that
some rights are "minor, trivial, non-stringent" and concludes that "We
shall therefore have to recognize that what is at work here is a matter of
degree". 25 It is important to remember that even Dworkin, who was the
first to characterize rights as trumps over utility,2 6 never promoted a
theory of rights at all costs, but recognized that some policy reasons could
overwhelm rights. His point was that not just any policy reasons could do
so. It is the conclusion that some difficult matters of degree are at issue,
which Dickson J. wants to bypass. But his two reasons for refusing to
22. Id at 1409-1410.
23. See, generally, M. Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law
(1981), 33 Stan. L.R. 591.
24. Id at 1411-1413.
25. Id at 1411.
26. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
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recognize necessity as a justification are unsatisfactory. His first is that
undue subjectivity would be imported into the law. His second that it is
beyond the limits of judicial decision-making to assess the policies behind
the Criminal Law. I shall now examine each of these in turn.
I. The Importation of Undue Subjectivity.
Dickson J. is reluctant to recognize and develop common law
justifications on the ground that he believes that this would entail that it
"would entitle a person to violate the law because on his view the law
conflicted with some higher social value".2 7 It is difficult to figure out
why he believes in this entailment. Nowhere else in the Criminal Law do
we acquit an individual just because he believes that he was not
responsible for what he did, or because he believes that what he did was
not illegal. The beliefs of the accused in this regard are generally held to
be irrelevant, and rightly so.28 It is not the beliefs of the accused but the
beliefs of the judiciary on the justifiability of the conduct that matter. The
idea that we should rely on just anybody's ideas about whether conduct
is considered justifiable should not be given the time of day.
Perhaps the thrust of Dickson J.'s concern about undue subjectivity is
that the judiciary will be unable to formulate standards by which to assess
justifiability, to determine that theft, for example, was justifiable because
so much was at stake. Judges will introduce their own standards, which
may differ greatly from those of their colleagues on the question how
much has to be at stake before the theft can be justified. The conclusion
seems to be that because differences in degree are so slippery, courts
should not even try to distinguish between the person who steals a fire
extinguisher because stealing gives him pleasure, and the person who
steals it in order to put out a blaze. But what is forgotten is that if we have
to concoct a defence for the latter, on the ground that "normal instincts
compelled" his conduct, the judiciary is going to reach widely disparate
conclusions about whether the conduct was instinctive, whether it was
normal, etc. It is less likely that there will be giant gulfs in opinion if the
question is framed in a non-fictional albeit evaluative way. In other areas
of law, the courts have coped with general principles without quavering
about disparaties in application. The principle, no person shall profit
from his own wrong, is a good example in this regard. The principle itself
does not contain criteria about what sort of profits it applies to, or what
types of wrong. These are questions which courts have to work out and
about which there can be great disagreement. The possibility of
27. Perka at 397.
28. See, for example, Roberge v. 1. (1983), 33 C.R. 289 at 302.
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disagreement is not regarded as a bar to application of the principle,
neither should it be with justifications.
At this point it is worthwhile to turn to the minority opinion of Wilson
J. in Perka, who seems to share this concern about the scope for
disagreement. While less extreme than that of Dickson J., Wilson J.'s
analysis is qualified by questionable limitations. She points to the fact that
on occasion the law places positive duties on a person and that these
positive duties may conflict with other negative duties. For example, a
parent may have a duty to rescue her child yet the only means of doing
so may be to steal a life jacket. In such situations where legal duties
conflict, and only is such situations, would Wilson J. allow the defence
of necessity to operate as a justification. Where the drowning person was
a stranger, rather than one's own child, the theft would not be justified.
Wilson J. states, "Such an act of rescue may be one deserving of no
punishment and indeed deserving of praise, but it is nevertheless a
culpable act if the law is violated in the process of rescue".
29
In essence, the point that is being made is that only one type of reason
ought to be regarded as justificatory, namely, that the act was required to
prevent the violation of another legal rule. Implicit in this conclusion is
a differentiation between moral justifiations and legal justifications. To
justify morally, one may rely on a well-equipped arsenal of strategies; but
to justify legally one would have to rely on only one type of claim.
Behind this distinction may lie the conviction that one ought not to look
beyond the perimeters of legal texts to find justificatory reasons; that a
divide exists between law and life which ought to be respected. The view
that the former should be the sole source of justifications can be criticized
on three grounds.
First, it would commit us to a mode of expression that is unfamiliar if
not bizarre. Should a person push another away from the path of a
runaway trolley, without having gained consent he would not be able to
"glory in his act" in a court of law. It seems outlandish to conclude, as
Wilson J. does, that a praiseworthy act may nevertheless be culpable.
Second, the notion that only the law can provide justificatory reasons
misconceives what the law maker has done. Take the example of rescuing
a stranger. The absence of a prohibition against ignoring strangers in
distress may be accounted for by reference to the view that the state ought
not to impose on individuals burdens which may unduly prevent them
from following their own projects. The absence of a provision demanding
rescue does not entail the conclusion that "the law" does not recognize
the value of the act of rescue. It may entail only the narrower view that
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"the law" recognizes ulterior reasons for not demanding it. Silence on the
issue of what conduct should be enforced need not relate to the issue of
what can count as a justification.
Third, the separation of moral and legal justification depends on the
notion that the law can, by itself, provide criteria by which to determine
whether an act is justified. But this it cannot do. Legal texts can never
reveal which of two duties should be fulfilled when they conflict, which
of the two is more important. The determination of importance will be
based on a number of "extra-legal" factors, of a moral nature - how
serious the violation, how severe the harm suffered, how serious the
potential ramifications. Wilson J. seems to suggest that the proportionality
judgement is one that can be made without looking beyond the text of the
law. If this is not the case, and if one must introduce moral criteria to
determine what one has reason to do, then it is hard to fathom why one
ought not to look beyond the law at an earlier stage in the search for
justifying reasons.
II. Judicial Decision-making and lts Limits
The point that judges ought to steer clear of importing common law
justifications into the law because this would involve meddling with the
legislature's business is related to the one just discussed, especially if the
latter point is grounded on the idea that the judiciary is ill-equipped to
formulate standards by which to assess justifiability. The connection is
that if the judiciary is ill-equipped, another branch of government should
be granted the authority to engage in the task. Dickson J.'s point is that
it is politically inappropriate for a court to make an evaluation of the
purposes embedded in legislation with a view of balancing these against
moral concerns which do not have legislative recognition.
What Dickson J. fails to recognize is that the practice of interpretation
demands that judges engage in just such activity whenever they are
confronted with a legal text. The activities of each participant in the legal
process are guided by his conception of the background of common
understanding and conventions against which he acts, and the
assumptions which, in the circumstances, are reasonable to make. Again,
the development of the principle no person shall profit from his own
wrong provides a clear example of judicial interpretation of legal texts in
the light of principles that are viewed as a basic aspect of the morality into
which the legal rules fit.
The co-operative relationship between court and legislature is not, on
this count, different from that between master and servant, where for
example, the former has told the latter not to disturb him but the latter
has discovered that the house is on fire. The implementation of normative
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directions will always involve some sort of second guessing when unusual
situations arise.
It is my contention that Dickson J.'s "institutional" arguments against
recognizing common law justifications are unpersuasive. I have tried to
show that non-utilitarian justifiations pervade our ethical thinking. If
there is to be a disjunction between ethical thought and criminal law
theory, as Dickson J. wants there to be, it must rest upon institutional
features peculiar to the latter - for example, that it is inappropriate for
an organ of state, because of its limited authority, or some such reason,
to follow the prescriptions of ordinary life. The Supreme Court has failed
to provide adequate grounds for the distinction. By separating the
criminal law from the structures of moral thought, the Court has risked
incoherence for no good reason.
